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Ember Bear

G1003 Russia Sabotage MITRE ATT&CK →

Also known as: UNC2589 · Bleeding Bear · DEV-0586 · Cadet Blizzard · Frozenvista · UAC-0056

Overview

Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155). Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas. Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022. There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.

Naming & attribution

Ember Bear is tracked under 7 names across the industry. It uses 47 documented ATT&CK techniques — more than 82% of the 174 groups tracked here. Activity attributed since at least 2020.

Who calls this group what — MITRE lists each alias with the report that used it, but not which vendor coined it.
NameFirst reported by
UNC2589Sadowski, J; Hall, R
Bleeding BearCrowdStrike
DEV-0586Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Cadet BlizzardMicrosoft Threat Intelligence
FrozenvistaUS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al
UAC-0056US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al

Distinctive techniques

Techniques this group uses that are rare across the other 173 tracked groups — these carry more signal than the near-universal ones.

  • T1491.002 External Defacement — used by 2 of 174 groups
  • T1588.005 Exploits — used by 2 of 174 groups
  • T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks — used by 2 of 174 groups
  • T1021 Remote Services — used by 3 of 174 groups
  • T1195 Supply Chain Compromise — used by 3 of 174 groups

Closest groups by technique overlap

Computed from shared ATT&CK techniques. Overlap is not attribution — distinct actors converge on the same tradecraft — but a high share is a useful pivot.

  • Agrius Iran — 13 shared techniques (23% overlap)
  • Dragonfly Russia — 17 shared techniques (20% overlap)
  • Threat Group-3390 China — 17 shared techniques (20% overlap)
  • OilRig Iran — 20 shared techniques (19% overlap)
  • Sandworm Team Russia — 20 shared techniques (19% overlap)
  • FIN13 — 16 shared techniques (19% overlap)

Malware families with current indicators

2 families attributed to Ember Bear, carrying 2 indicators currently tracked from abuse.ch ThreatFox, MalwareBazaar, URLhaus and SSLBL. MITRE documents what a group does; this is what its tooling is doing now.

  • WhisperGate 1 indicators
  • SaintBot 1 indicators

Browse or copy the indicators by hash, domain, IP or URL, filtered by age from 1 day to 3 years.

Regions

Ukraine

Capabilities

  • Supply-chain compromise — ATT&CK T1195
  • Destructive / data-wiping operations — ATT&CK T1561.002; software: WhisperGate
  • Exploitation of public-facing / client applications — ATT&CK T1190, T1203
  • Custom malware/implant development — ATT&CK: 4 attributed custom malware families

TTPs — 47 techniques across 14 tactics

Reconnaissance

Resource Development

Persistence

Defense Impairment

Credential Access

Command and Control

Exfiltration

Impact

Tools & malware (11)

P.A.S. Webshell · CrackMapExec · Responder · ngrok · reGeorg · WhisperGate · Saint Bot · PsExec · Rclone · BloodHound · Impacket

Reporting (3)